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I.

INTRODUCTION

This marks the second appeal of this case to the Idaho Supreme Court. As with the first
appeal, the Appellants allege that the lower-court judge abused his discretion when ruling on
various evidentiary questions. The Appellants also further allege that there was a lack of
"substantial, competent evidence" to support the jury's verdict. It is interesting to note that the
Appellants spend sixteen (16) pages of their Appellants' Brief detailing the evidence presented
at trial. Unfortunately for the Appellants, the Idaho Supreme Court is not the appropriate place
to try (or re-try) their case. Rather, this case was appropriately tried before a jury, at the district
court level.
Throughout the trial, the Honorable Randy Stoker was often called on to exercise his
discretion and rule on certain evidentiary issues. As concerns those rulings now challenged by
the Appellants, the transcript shows that Judge Stoker considered all relevant factors prior to
making his decisions, and therefore, did not abuse his discretion. Furthermore, even if Judge
Stoker committed error by allowing the evidence that the Appellants now challenge, other
evidence in the case, particularly the testimony of the Respondent, provided the jury with a
sufficient basis to support their verdict. Therefore, this Court should grant Judge Stoker and the
jury the deference due them, and uphold the verdict in this case.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case was originally tried before a jury on October 22 through 26, 2007. That trial
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs. However, the Appellants successfully appealed that case.

See, Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 147 Idaho 813 (Idaho 2009). The latest trial commenced
on October 19, 2010.
The crux of the Respondent's case was as follows: During the summer of 2005, the
Respondent fed Land O'Lakes (LOL) milk replacer to his heifer calves, but not to his bull
calves, which instead received "government" replacer. The heifer calves experienced a greater
Respondents' Brief-4-

level scours (diarrhea) and resultant death than in a normal year. After being unable to
determine the exact cause of the scours, in late summer 2005, Mr. Hurtado began to feed
government replacer to the heifers. Shortly thereafter, the rate of scours and death dropped to
normal levels. Additionally, the Respondent had Mr. Brudevold, a professional ruminant
nutritionist and dairyman himself, testify that, in his expert opinion, the Respondent's scours
were "nutritional" scours (caused by feed), and further testify to the fact that his own calves also
experienced scours at about the same time as Mr. Hurtado when feeding the LOL replacer.
Furthermore, Mr. Hurtado testified to his belief as to the market value of a single calf, and as to
his memory of the number of calves, above normal levels, that died while he was feeding the
LOL replacer.
The Appellants' defense can be summarized as follows: In order to convince the jury
that it was unlikely that the replacer was defective, fact witnesses testified to the quality-control
measures that Land O'Lakes follows. Mr. Riesberg, a chemist, also testified that three of the
four lots that Mr. Hurtado's replacer might possibly have come from were tested, and
considered, in his expert opinion, to be safe for consumption. A veterinarian for the Appellants
testified to his belief of the market value of a heifer calf. Additionally, the Appellants also
questioned workers from the J and J Calf Ranch, eliciting from them estimates of calf deaths
that were different (greater) than what Mr. Hurtado testified to.
During the course of Mr. Brudevold's expert opinion and factual testimony, the
Appellants objected time and time again. The basis of these objections was a lack of foundation
to support Mr. Brudevold's opinions and fact testimony. Judge Stoker, after consideration of
arguments on the objections, continued to uphold these objections until he was satisfied that the
Respondent had elicited answers from Mr. Brudevold to adequately lay the necessary
foundation for his expert opinions and fact testimony.
After hearing the substantial, although conflicting, evidence from both sides, the jury
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determined that the LOL replacer was defective, and awarded damages in the amount of
$50,000.00. The Appellants now appeal this verdict, arguing that the Respondent did not meet
his burden of proof to exclude reasonable alternative causes for the heifer calf deaths;
challenging the jury's determination by arguing that substantial and competent evidence was
not presented to support the jury's verdict; and challenging Judge Stoker's discretion in
determining that adequate foundational testimony was eventually elicited to allow Mr.
Brudevold's expert opinions and factual testimony.

III.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

A) Did the Respondent meet its burden of proof to exclude alternative reasonable causes
for the heifer deaths?
B) Is the jury's verdict supported by substantial and competent evidence?
-1) As to the issue of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability/product
defect?
-2) As to the amount of damages?
C) Did the lower court correctly rule that Mr. Brudevold could testify concerning
defects in the milk replacer?
D) Did the lower court correctly rule that Mr. Brudevold could testify concerning
similar problems with the milk replacer on his own ranch?

IV.

ARGUMENT

A) THE RESPONDENT MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF TO EXCLUDE ALTERNATIVE
REASONABLE CA USES FOR THE HEIFER DEATHS
Appellants contend that the Respondent was required, as a matter of law, to put on
evidence of "proper" scientific testing to exclude possible causes for the scours other than the
LOL replacer. The Respondent does not dispute the Appellants' contention of law that, when a
claim of product liability is based on circumstantial evidence, as it was here, the plaintiff has the
Respondents' Brief-6-

burden to put on evidence to exclude other "reasonably likely" causes. Farmer v. International
Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 749 (1976). However, the Respondent does dispute the
Appellants' claim that the Respondent's evidence did not meet this burden.
To rule out causes other than the LOL replacer, the Respondent put on the testimony of
Mr. Hurtado. Mr. Hurtado testified that while he was using the LOL replacer, the rate of scours
and death among his heifer calves was well above normal levels. Tr. I 46-4 7. Mr. Hurtado
further testified to only changing the milk replacer from LOL to government replacer, and then
the death rate dropped off to normal. Tr. I 53-54.
Such action by Mr. Hurtado is equivalent to the most conclusive of scientific
experiments. Feeding the calves with the LOL versus without the LOL can be considered two
"tests." Feeding with the LOL can be considered the "control." Feeding without the LOL can
be considered the "experiment." Therefore, the LOL replacer is the solo "variable." When all
things are constant between a control test and an experiment test except for a single variable,
then one can be assured that any difference in result between the two tests is caused solely by
the variable. Therefore, Mr. Hurtado's actions, in changing the milk replacer and nothing else,
constitute a "proper" scientific experiment showing that the LOL replacer alone was the cause
of the scours and deaths. Because the testimony shows that the LOL replacer could be the only
possible cause of the scours and deaths, the testimony also ruled out any other reasonably likely
causes. Therefore, Mr. Hurtado' s testimony describing the change from LOL replacer to
government replacer, and subsequent resolution of his problems, met the Respondent's burden
of proof to put on evidence to rule out other reasonably likely causes of the calf deaths.
B) THE JURY VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE
1) The Jury's Finding of a Product Defect/Breach of Warranty of Merchantability Should Not
be Disturbed because it was Based on Substantial, Competent, Although Conflicting, Evidence.
"Issues of fact are questions for the jury, and the jury's verdict on such matters will not,
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in most instances, be disturbed on appeal." Boe! v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 12
(2002) (citing Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 726 (1987)).
An appellate court may only set aside the jury's findings when they are "clearly erroneous."

See, Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 900 (2004) (citing McCray v. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509,
513 (2001)). The jury's findings are clearly erroneous only if they are not supported by
"substantial and competent" evidence. See, id "Findings based on substantial, competent
evidence, although conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal." Id
Whether evidence is substantial is neither a question of volume, nor a question of
comparison by an appellate court's weighing of one party's evidence against the others. Rather,
evidence is substantial so long as a reasonable person would accept and rely on it. Id In fact,
any weighing of evidence or questioning of credibility by the appellate court is strictly
forbidden. Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316, 319 (Ct. App. 1994). In sum, only if the Court
concludes that reasonable minds could not differ, should it set aside the jury verdict. Boe!,

supra.
The evidence presented to the jury below was indeed conflicting. The jury heard from
the Plaintiff that he began feeding the LOL milk replacer to his heifers, but not his bulls living
under otherwise identical conditions, and that the heifers, but not the bulls, began to experience
an increased rate of scours and death. Tr. 32-33. Furthermore, the Plaintiff testified that he
switched the heifers from LOL to "government" replacer, and the heifers stopped suffering
scours and death. Tr. 34
The jury also heard from fact and expert witnesses for the defendant. Mr. Macfarland,
of Valley Co-Ops, testified that he re-sold the excess LOL replacer to other ranches in the area,
and those ranches never complained about the LOL replacer. Tr. 319-20. Mr. Karstens, the
Director of Operations and Quality Assurance for LOL testified to the quality control
mechanisms in place to attempt to ensure that LOL replacer is healthy. Tr. 515-32. Mr.
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Zadnicheck, the production manager at the LOL milk replacer plant, testified that the replacer
fed by the Plaintiff must have come from one or more of four lots. Tr. 343-52. Mr. Riesberg, a
chemist for LOL, testified that of those four lots, samples were tested out of three of those lots,
and found by LOL to be suitable for consumption. Tr. 393-415.
Clearly, the Plaintiff put on evidence tending to show that the LOL replacer was
defective, and the Defendant put on evidence to suggest that it would be unlikely that the LOL
replacer was defective. Although the evidence in this case is conflicting, the evidence put on by
the Plaintiff was substantial, and therefore the jury's findings should be upheld. The Plaintiff's
testimony was equivalent to the best of scientific experiments. When experimenting to
determine causation, one strives to eliminate all variables but the one being tested. If one can
run two tests where all but one variable remains constant, and the results are different for the
two tests, than one can be assured that the difference resulted from the variable. Such a test is
exactly what Mr. Hurtado testified to conducting. He was feeding the LOL replacer and his
heifers were dying. He changed only the replacer, and his heifers no longer died. It is certainly
reasonable for the jury in this case to have concluded, based on this purest of scientific
experiments, and even in the face of evidence suggesting that a fault with the LOL replacer was
unlikely, that the LOL replacer was defective. Therefore, the jury's finding of a product
defect/breach of the implied warranty of merchantability was based on substantial evidence, and
should not be overturned on appeal.
2) The Jury's Finding of Damages in the Amount of$50,000 Should Not be Disturbed because
it was Based on Substantial, Competent, Although Conflicting, Evidence.
The Appellants' challenge to the sufficiency of evidence concerning damages is twofold: The Appellants argue that the Respondent did not meet its burden of proof to show
evidence of fair market value. The Appellants also argue that the finding by the jury of
damages in the amount of $50,000.00 was not supported by substantial evidence.
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a) The Respondent Met its Burden of Proo/to Present Evidence of Fair Market Value
As stated above, a jury's findings of fact (including damages) should not be set aside
unless they are not supported by substantial, competent evidence. The Appellants do argue that
no evidence was presented by the respondent to show fair market value of a heifer calf. The
Respondent agrees that the proper measure of damages is fair market value; however, the
transcript of the trial clearly shows that the Respondent did put on evidence of the fair market
value of a heifer calf.

'"It is settled rule in Idaho that the owner of property is a competent witness to its value,
as he is presumed to be familiar with its value by reason of inquiries, comparisons, purchases
and sales."' Howes v. Curtis, 104 Idaho 563, 568 (1983) (quoting Weaver v. Village of
Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189, 193 (1968)) (emphasis added). The Appellants argue that Mr. Hurtado
could not testify to his estimate of the value of a heifer calf without providing some basis to
show that his estimate was linked to the market in heifer calves. However, the rule in Idaho is
"settled:" the law "presume[s]" that the owner of property has inquired into sales and purchases.
Mr. Hurtado, as the owner of the destroyed property, was not required to provide any
background concerning the basis for his value estimate. Mr. Hurtado was asked if his opinion
of what it would cost to buy replacement calves on the open market was that it would cost
$10007 He replied, "Yes." Tr. 145. Therefore, the Respondent did properly meet its burden to
put on evidence of fair market value.
b) The Jury's Determination of Damages in the Amount o/$50,000 was Supported by
Substantial, Although Conflicting, Evidence.
Substantial, though conflicting, evidence was presented by both parties on the market
value of a heifer calf. Mr. Hurtado's estimate, which is presumed by law to be based on
experience buying and selling on the market, was certainly reasonable for the jury to rely on.
The Appellants also put on reasonably reliable evidence of market value to contradict Mr.
Respondents' Brief-I 0-

Hurtado's evidence: a veterinarian testified that a heifer calf was only worth $250, Tr. 483, and
the Appellants also revealed Mr. Hurtado's deposition testimony that a calf was worth $550.
Tr. 173. Reasonable minds could certainly differ on which of the three estimates to believe, and
therefore, there was substantial evidence on the question of value per calf.
Substantial, although conflicting, evidence was also presented as to the number of calves
that died. Mr. Hurtado testified from memory that 130 heifers died due to the LOL replacer.
Tr. 146-4 7. Other testimony, from workers at the ranch, remembered higher death rates: "1 Oto
12" per day for two weeks and then more for the rest of a month, Tr. 230; and "half' of "900."
Tr. 242. It is certainly reasonable for a jury to "accept and rely on" the memory of the owner of
destroyed property. It would also be reasonable for a jury to rely on the memory of those who
worked with the property on a daily basis. Therefore, although the testimony was conflicting, it
was also substantial, and therefore, the jury was free to rely on it in determining the number of
calves that died, and their determination should not be disturbed on appeal.
One can only speculate as to the basis of the jury's final calculation of damages.
However, because substantial, although conflicting, evidence was presented on the two factors
relevant to the final damages amount (market value of one calf and the total number of calves
lost due to the LOL replacer), the jury's determination of evidence should be upheld.
Finally, because the jury's determinations of breach of the warranty of merchantability
and damages were both supported by substantial, competent evidence, the lower court ruled
correctly when it denied the Appellants a directed verdict and judgment NOV. See, Carlson v.
Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 645-46 (Ct. App. 2008).
C) BECAUSE MR. BRUDEVOLD WAS PROPERLY QUALIFIED AS A NUTRITIONIST, HIS
OPINIONS CONCERNING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE LOL REPLACER WERE
PROPERLY ADMITTED

"Decisions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of evidence are within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be upset on appeal absent a showing that the trial court
Respondents ' Brief- I I -

abused its discretion." Fish Breeders ofIdaho, Inc. v. Langdon, Inc., 108 Idaho 379,382
(1985).
Idaho Rule of Evidence § 702 requires that a witness be qualified by "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education" in order to testify as an expert witness. The same rule also
requires that the testimony only be admitted if the "[sJcientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact .... " Therefore, in order to lay a proper foundation to
qualify a witness as an expert, the witness must testify to his special experience, knowledge, or
skill that makes his testimony more helpful to the jury then their own common knowledge and
experience. Idaho Dept. ofHealth and Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 474,477 (2010).
Mr. Brudevold's foundational testimony can be summarized as follows: he is a
professional ruminant nutritionist, Tr. 59; he works with dairies to determine ifthere are any
nutritional problems, Tr. 59-60; he also has some on-the-job training in the manufacture of milk
replacers, Tr. 61-62; he has dealt with scours in the past and has a normal routine to try and
determine if the scours are nutritionally caused. Tr. 64-65. Mr. Brudevold's expert opinions
can be summarized as follows: because there were no bacteria in the scour samples, the scours
were likely nutritionally caused, Tr. 65-69; that excessive heat during the drying process can
lead to destruction and non-digestibility of milk replacer proteins (i.e., scours). Tr. 122-25.
The Appellants argue that Mr. Brudevold needed to conduct testing of the LOL replacer
in order to give an expert opinion that it was excessively heated. However, Mr. Brudevold did
not testify that the LOL feed was excessively heated; only that excessive heating can cause
replacer to be un-digestible, resulting in scours and death. He left it to the jury to draw
whatever conclusions they wished from that knowledge. Mr. Brudevold was certainly qualified
to provide this knowledge, as he had training in milk replacer production.
The Appellants also argue that Mr. Brudevold was not qualified to give an opinion that
the scours experienced by the Respondent were nutritionally caused. However, Mr.
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Brudevold's specialized knowledge in ruminant nutrition and specialized experience in
determining if scours are nutritionally caused certainly qualified him to opine that the scours in
this case were likely nutritionally caused.
Furthermore, a verdict will not be overturned on appeal, nor a new trial granted based on
a faulty evidentiary ruling, if the error is harmless. See, Gonzales v. Hodson, 91 Idaho 330, 333
( 1966). As has already been argued, the jury's verdict can be sustained merely on the
substantial and competent evidence provided by Mr. Hurtado's testimony. Specifically, Mr.
Hurtado's testimony that his heifers were experiencing higher than normal death rates when
consuming the LOL replacer, that Mr. Hurtado changed only the replacer, and then death rates
dropped back to normal. Therefore, any error in allowing the expert testimony of Mr.
Brudevold is harmless, and the jury's verdict should be upheld.
D) THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY PERlvfITTED lvJR. BRUDEVOLD TO PROVIDE
FACTUAL TES11MONY CONCERNING SIMILAR CALF DEATHS ON HIS OWN RANCH

The Appellants argue that all of Mr. Brudevold's testimony was "expert" testimony, and
therefore required the laying of a proper foundation concerning his expert qualifications.
However, much of Mr. Brudevold's testimony was given merely as a fact witness. The factual
testimony that the Appellants now complain of was Mr. Brudevold's testimony that, at about
the same time that the Respondent was experiencing scours and feeding LOL replacer, Mr.
Brudevold was also feeding LOL replacer and experiencing scours. Tr. 70-72. Mr. Brudevold
further testified that when he switched to the government replacer, his calves' scours resolved.
Tr. 73. Mr. Brudevold also testified that he later tried feeding the LOL replacer again, those
calves immediately got scours, and so he completely stopped using LOL replacer. Tr. 74.
The Appellants argue that the above testimony was offered as an example of similar
problems with the same product, in order to bolster the claim of product defect. The Appellants
further argue that no foundation was laid to show that the problems experienced by Mr.
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Brudevold were "substantially similar" to those experienced by the Respondent, as required by
Idaho case-law. See, Fish Breeders ofIdaho, Inc. v. Langdon, Inc., 108 Idaho 379,382 (1985).
The Appellants contend that the Respondent needed to show that the LOL replacer fed by Mr.
Brudevold was from the same lot as that fed by the Respondent.
No Idaho case has ever held that, in order to put on evidence of similar problems from a
substance, a plaintiff must show that in both cases the substance came from the same lot. This
is not surprising, as appellate courts tend to defer to the "sound discretion" of the trial court to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the situations were "substantially similar." See, e.g., id.
The trial court in this case considered extensive argument on the admissibility of Mr.
Brudevold's fact testimony. The trial court carefully excluded testimony of similar problems
until after it was content that proper foundation had been laid to show "substantial similarity."
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of similar scour
problems when feeding LOL replacer. See, id.
Finally, as with Mr. Brudevold's expert testimony, his factual testimony was also
unnecessary to sustain the jury's verdict, and so any error by the trial court in allowing the
testimony would be harmless.
V.

ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL

Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3) requires that attorneys' fees be granted to the prevailing
party, both at the trial level and on appeal, when the action is to recover in a "commercial
transaction." See, Walker v. American Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 834 (1997) (citing Bott v.
Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471,481 (1992)). Attorneys' fees under 12-120(3) are only
appropriate where "the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis
upon which the party is attempting to recover." Id. This Court has previously ruled that 12120(3) does command a grant of attorneys' fees when the suit is a products liability case based
on an express warranty. Id. at 826, 34. The reasoning provided by this Court was that the
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warranty is "part of' the transaction. Id at 834. Although this Court has yet to rule similarly in
a case like this one, involving an implied warranty, the result should be the same. Implied
warranties are every bit a "part of' a transaction as express warranties. Therefore, Idaho Code
Sec. 12-120(3) requires a grant of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in this case, which is
based on the implied warranty of merchantability.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Appellants spend most of their brief attempting to show that the evidence in support
of their defense was somehow better than the evidence put on by the Respondent. The
Respondent does not deny that the Appellants put on substantial, competent evidence.
However, the fact that a defendant puts on evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to
find in its favor does not mean that a reasonable trier of fact could have only found in the
defendant's favor.
In this case, the Respondent also put on substantial competent evidence. Particularly,
Mr. Hurtado testified to the fact that when he was feeding LOL replacer to heifers, they were
experiencing scours and resultant death at a higher rate then normal; when he switched the feed
to government replacer, the heifers experienced only normal rates of death. This testimony not
only was evidence excluding all reasonable potential causes of death other than the LOL
replacer, but was also evidence reasonably allowing the jury to conclude that the LOL replacer
was defective. Furthermore, Mr. Hurtado testified to his memory of how many calves died, and
his estimate of the market value of a calf, providing the jury with substantial, competent
evidence of damages.
Finally, although not necessary to sustain the jury's verdict, Judge Stoker allowed Mr.
Brudevold to testify that his calves consuming the LOL replacer experienced scours at
approximately the same time as J and J calves, and further testify that it was his opinion that the
scours in the J and J calves were "nutritional" scours. The factual testimony of Mr. Brudevold's
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own experience was properly allowed only after Judge Stoker ensured that a proper foundation
was laid to show true similarity between Mr. Brudevold's experience with the LOL replacer and
Mr. Hurtado's experience with the LOL replacer. The expert testimony was only allowed after
Judge Stoker ensured that proper foundational testimony of Mr. Brudevold's special knowledge
was elicited. Therefore, although any error in allowing Mr. Brudevold's testimony would be
harmless, Judge Stoker in fact exercised his discretion appropriately when he allowed the
testimony.
Because Judge Stoker did not abuse his discretion in allowing Mr. Brudevold's factual
and expert testimony, and because any error he may have committed was harmless, and because
the Respondent put on evidence to meet all of his burdens of proof, and further because the
evidence put on by the Respondent was substantial and competent, the jury's verdict in favor of
the Respondent should be upheld.

Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 2011

Law Office of Harry DeHaan
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